DOGE, Startups & Political Party Paradoxes

Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy outlined the rationale behind their Department of Government Efficiency project (DOGE) in the Wall Street Journal last week. DOGE is intended to serve as an advisory board to streamline the U.S. federal government and reduce inefficiencies, particularly within three-letter agencies like HHS, EPA, FTC, DOD, etc. While the idea is controversial, it’s also hard not to like. No doubt government isn’t as efficient as it could be, and with the exploding federal deficit, cost reduction sounds like a nice idea. However, it’s worth noting that several presidents have tried similar initiatives in the past with limited success.

What makes this particular effort interesting, though, is its focus on reducing the thousands of regulations federal agencies have implemented over the years. The idea is that fewer regulations would mean reduced headcount to enforce those regulations and taxpayer savings. Many Americans may not realize that unelected federal agency staff write thousands of rules annually governing how businesses across the country operate.

These rules, while rooted in laws passed by Congress, are written and enforced by the agencies themselves. For example, Congress might pass a law like the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the EPA would then draft and enforce specific rules regarding contaminants, pollutant limits, and reporting requirements. This structure makes sense because Congress doesn’t have the bandwidth to dive into the details of implementing every law.

Critics argue that these agencies have amassed too much power, often acting on their own priorities rather than staying accountable to the public.

Musk and Ramaswamy wrote in their piece:

“Our nation was founded on the basic idea that the people we elect run the government. That isn’t how America functions today. Most legal edicts aren’t laws enacted by Congress but “rules and regulations” promulgated by unelected bureaucrats—tens of thousands of them each year. Most government enforcement decisions and discretionary expenditures aren’t made by the democratically elected president or even his political appointees but by millions of unelected, unappointed civil servants within government agencies who view themselves as immune from firing thanks to civil-service protections.

This is antidemocratic and antithetical to the Founders’ vision. It imposes massive direct and indirect costs on taxpayers. Thankfully, we have a historic opportunity to solve the problem.”

Government agencies, like most organizations, grow in size and scope over time. It’s human nature to want to do more with more influence, more budget, and more people. Rarely do people within these organizations prioritize limiting their scope or shrinking their footprint. It’s just not in our nature.

As a result, millions of pages of regulations now govern nearly every aspect of American business. While many of these rules are undoubtedly necessary, it’s reasonable to assume there’s significant overreach.

All of this reminds me of a talk Bill Gurley gave a while back on regulatory capture. Regulatory capture occurs when agencies tasked with regulating an industry become overly influenced by the interests of the organizations they regulate.

Gurley talked about a classic example of this in healthcare. Epic Systems, the healthcare software giant, benefited enormously from the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA’s HITECH Act incentivized healthcare providers to adopt electronic medical records (EMR) software. A new agency, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), now renamed to the Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy and Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ASTP/ONC), was established to administer this program.

ONC mandated payments of $44,000 per doctor to purchase EMR software and an additional $17,000 for demonstrating "Meaningful Use" — proof they were actively using it. Epic’s CEO played a pivotal role in designing the requirements for Meaningful Use, which aligned closely with Epic’s existing products. This created high barriers to entry, forcing smaller competitors out of the market or to incur major penalties for being out of compliance with the new regulations.

ONC has gone on to write more and more rules on top of the EHR standards for things like health IT certification, interoperability standards, and information blocking. If you work at a health tech startup, it’s more likely than not that these rules impact your company in some way.

Perhaps the best examples of regulatory capture came out of the Great Financial Crisis in 2008. Financial regulations, like Dodd-Frank, reinforced the dominance of the large incumbent banks. These rules imposed strict capital and compliance requirements, which big banks could absorb but smaller ones could not.

The result was that large institutions like JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs emerged stronger than ever, making it difficult for smaller banks and new entrants to thrive.

Again, while many of these rules are valuable, many are not. And the overarching structure of the system generally favors large incumbents. This is true for two reasons:

1/ Lobbying Power: Large companies have the resources to influence Congress and federal agencies through lobbying and campaign donations. Many of them house large government affairs and public policy staffs in Washington.

2/ Established precedents: Policymakers often are reluctant to implement big changes to the way businesses operate and as a result design their programs and rules around the existing establishments.

If DOGE succeeds in reducing federal agency regulations, it would inherently challenge rules designed to protect the country’s largest companies that have benefited from the regulatory capture dynamic — ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Boeing, UnitedHealth, Walmart, etc. 

This is a rather surprising effort to come out of a Republican administration that has typically supported big business, but it makes sense in the context of some of Trump’s other non-traditional decisions since winning the election. Take some of the comments he made when nominating RFK for Secretary of HHS:

“For too long, Americans have been crushed by the industrial food complex and drug companies who have engaged in deception, misinformation, and disinformation. HHS will play a big role in helping ensure that everybody will be protected from harmful chemicals, pollutants, pesticides, pharmaceutical products, and food additives.”

This statement sounds more like left-wing activism than traditional Republican rhetoric.

Back to the DOGE effort. No doubt the purpose of this effort is to reduce the cost of the federal government, but by unraveling many of the regulations that protect incumbents, this also starts to shift the balance of power back towards startups. Multiple VCs have talked about how these regulations have paralyzed the work of many startups, particularly in fintech, crypto, and AI. While Musk and Ramaswamy have run big businesses that have undoubtedly benefited from these regulations, they’re both founders and entrepreneurs as opposed to traditional, big company managers. Much of this effort feels like an indirect backlash against the “managerial revolution” where professional managers hold the primary power in organizations and economies as opposed to inventors, entrepreneurs, and founders. So, in some ways, DOGE isn’t just an effort to reduce the size of government; it’s also very much an effort to support a thriving and innovative startup ecosystem. 

This won’t be easy. In fact, it might be impossible. There will be endless lawsuits, and large, powerful businesses with enormous lobbying budgets will scramble to protect the status quo.

But if it’s successful, DOGE has the potential to reduce the size of government and weaken the big established incumbents, creating more opportunities for startups to drive innovation. And it may realign some aspects of the American political party system. If it doesn’t succeed, it may simply underscore and reinforce how entrenched the existing system and structure have become.

Growth Without Capital

In the early days, startups are very capital-intensive. They don't have a product generating positive cash flow, so they often rely on some outside capital (debt or equity) to grow their top line. This is a necessary evil in the early days to get a company up and running. With the need for capital underscoring the financing strategy for most startups, it's easy to forget that the best companies are companies that don't need capital to grow. An excellent example of this is a franchise like Subway that leverages franchisees' capital to open new stores and expand its footprint. In addition to a franchise model, there are lots of other business models that companies can use to grow without capital:

1/ Preselling or securing customer deposits: getting a customer to pay in advance or fund the development of a product. 

2/ Joint ventures and strategic partnerships where a partner provides the capital to grow. 

3/ Government grants and contracts.

4/ Revenue sharing and licensing agreements. Getting your own sales team to sell other people's stuff.

5/ Supplier financing. Getting very favorable payment terms from your vendors such that they can use funds elsewhere for some period of time.

6/ Revenue from Licensing Technology or IP: Companies can license their technology or intellectual property to other firms, generating revenue without direct investment.

7/ Network effects. Building a product that’s more valuable as more people use it, so there’s a built-in incentive for customers to market it for you.

Early-stage companies will be inclined to rely on organic growth as they get off the ground. But it's important to incorporate — or at least be thinking about — less capital-intensive growth strategies and business models as the company matures. Again, the best companies out there are those that can achieve high growth rates without a corresponding need for capital investment.

Perseverance As A Competitive Advantage

One of the questions startups frequently get from prospective investors is: why won't the big incumbents (Epic, Cerner, or whoever) just do what you're doing and put you out of business? This is always a difficult question for a founder to answer because the reasons often aren't obvious and can be hard to describe. The difficulty of bringing something new to the market is typically underestimated, and the details really matter. And often, these details aren't well understood by a casual observer. See this excellent post that Chris Dixon wrote back in the day on what he calls the Idea Maze to understand why the answer can be hard to understand from the outside.

I was chatting with an investor last week who had a good way of summarizing why startups have one fundamental advantage over incumbents: they simply can't afford to quit.

For a startup, failure isn’t just a setback—it can mean the end of the business, the loss of investor money, and reputational harm to the founder. This makes persistence almost a necessity.

Large companies, on the other hand, often have a lower threshold for pulling the plug. If a new product doesn’t show quick growth or the market looks small, they cut their losses and move on. For them, it’s just another line item in their budget; for startups, it’s survival.

This urgency forces startups to be more resourceful, nimble, and focused. Where big companies might give up too early, startups are far more likely to push through.

And very often, that’s where the real breakthroughs happen—not because they have more resources, but because they have no choice but to persevere.

Of course, this topic is way, way more complicated. And I'll write more about it at some point. But sometimes, it's simply the refusal to quit that makes all the difference.

Rule of 40 vs. Real Cash

It seems like whenever we go through a shift in the economy, the fundamentals of finance become increasingly important. During the near-zero interest rate environment we had for more than a decade, growth was rewarded in an outsized way. 10x and 20x revenue multiples were common for startups. Because the risk-free rate of return was near zero, there was no real opportunity cost in investing in something risky. That drove up the value of companies that were investing in big growth. Today, this has changed quite a bit. There is an opportunity cost to investing in something that might not generate cash for a while. So, a lot of the attention has shifted from growth to profitability. Investors want to see cash get generated more quickly. The Rule of 40 (ensuring that a company's operating margin % + its growth rate exceeds 40%) has become a common way of categorizing top-tier startups in this environment. Boards are pushing company leaders to get to Rule of 40 as quickly as possible. Given so many companies are coming out of the grow-at-all-costs approach, the easy thing to do is to pull back on investments, project a conservative growth rate, and drive down costs to make the company's operating margin high enough that it gets the company to 40+ in the next year or two.

This is a potentially short-sighted approach, especially for earlier-stage companies with small revenue. Returning to the fundamentals of finance, we know that the value of a financial asset is the present value of the cash that you can take out of it over its lifetime. Forecasting these cash flows is done using a discounted cash flow model. Revenue multiples and the Rule of 40 are crude proxies for understanding the present value of future cash flows. The danger of the Rule of 40 for smaller companies that aren't generating significant cash flows is that they underinvest in growth to achieve a higher operating margin at a point in time but never get to a point where the company generates high amounts of actual cash.

The Rule of 40 measures a point in time calculated using the % growth rate and the % profit. But companies are not valued on what they're doing right now. And they're not valued on their growth rate. And they're not valued on their profit margins. They're valued on real amounts of cash generated in the future. Rule of 40 can be a useful metric for investors to gauge the health of a business. But that has to be tempered with an understanding of the investments the company is making today to drive future real cash flows. 

One good way to manage this is to classify revenue and cost projections into two buckets. 1/ Core: revenue that will be generated from investments made in the past, and 2/ New: revenue that will be generated from new investments. Leaders need to really understand the future cash flows associated with their core business and whether or not that will produce adequate cash flows relative to expectations. That provides the input needed to throttle investments in new initiatives. The core should get more profitable and the new stuff should drive lots of new revenue. Blending the two and optimizing to a short-term metric runs the risk of severing the company’s execution plan from what’s best for investors over the long term.

Some VC Insights

This recent episode, 20VC Roundtable: Is the Venture Model Broken? was one of the best I’ve heard in close to ten years of listening.

I found myself jotting down a few notes. Listen to the whole thing, but here are some of the highlights:

  • VCs tend to jump to the “next big thing” (Crypto, AI, etc.) because that’s how you get markups on your investments. But, by definition, the “next big thing” isn’t contrarian and, in theory, wouldn’t be where the outsized returns are. There is an interesting conflict for VCs between showing a good markup and getting actual returns.

  • In venture, patience is an arbitrage.

  • The true outlier investments, in theory, are the cheap investments. That’s because they’re truly contrarian, and nobody wants to invest in them.

  • Pre-product-market-fit, stay as lean as possible. If you get ahead of the market, the team will have built things that aren’t perfectly aligned to the market, and they’ll develop opinions about what the market needs based on what you have and what’s been built. Slow that down and make sure the market is pulling and you’re not pushing.

  • When you have product-market fit, your next customer should be marginally more attractive than the last one. e.g., you shouldn’t have to be straining your offering to get more customers. At some point, everyone should want it.

  • Often, a company’s go-to-market is better than its product-market fit, and you can fool yourself into thinking you’ve found it.

Refusing To Fail

I heard Phil Mickelson, the legendary golfer, tell a great story the other day.

He was asked what makes the best golfers the best golfers in the world. He told a story about how a long time ago, he really struggled with short putts. One day his coach recommended that he try to make 100 three-foot putts in a row. If he missed one, he'd have to start all over again. And he should keep practicing this until he can reliably make 100 in a row. He claims that one time he made it all the way to 99, missed the 100th, and started over. 

Years later, he was mentoring an up-and-coming amateur golfer who was struggling with short putts, and he gave that golfer the same advice. Several months later, he checked in on how the golfer was doing with his putting, and the golfer said, "yea, that was really hard, I got to where I could make about 50 in a row, and I gave up.”

This golfer never made it in the PGA.

This is a great analogy when thinking about startup investing. Often, in the early days, you're really investing less in the idea or the product or the market; you're really investing in the founder themselves and their willingness to persevere and navigate through the idea maze and do what, in some cases, seems impossible. Some people work on some projects where for whatever reason, they will absolutely refuse to fail. Elon Musk is a great example. Both SpaceX and Tesla should've failed multiple times. But he persevered and forced it to happen through sheer will. Of course, he's incredibly smart and talented, but that wouldn't have been nearly enough. This quality doesn't exist in everyone, and even for those that do, it doesn't exist for every project at every time in their lives, given changing life circumstances and priorities.

This golf analogy is a good one to consider when you're investing at an early stage where you don't have much to go on other than the talents, skills, and dedication of the founder and founding team.

The Operator Shortage

Howard Lindzon described the current state of startups really well the other day on the Animal Spirits podcast. I’m paraphrasing, but he said something like:

There are lots of good ideas. There are lots of founders that want to pursue those ideas. There’s lots of cheap capital for founders to raise and build companies around those ideas. But there’s an extreme shortage of qualified operators to go and execute on those ideas.

There aren’t enough high-quality operators that have actually built companies from the ground up. As a result, we’re seeing significant wage inflation across almost every function inside of startups. The ability to recruit and retain top talent is more important than it has ever been in tech (Apple just offered $180k bonuses to engineers to get them not to leave and go work on the metaverse or crypto). Good companies won’t have a problem raising capital, but almost all of them will struggle to hire the best people.

Build a brand that attracts both customers and potential employees. Hire managers with high levels of followership.

Be a company that people want to work at with leaders that people want to work for. Nothing is more important in this market.

Discipline In Company Buildling

I love this Tweet from Dan Hockenmaier.

It's very common for early-stage startups to over-title people to get them in the door. Often they don't have the clout or the cash to get great people, so they use a senior title as a way of convincing someone they like to join the team. This is a mistake and causes all kinds of issues down the road. When the company is finally able to recruit people that are legitimately at the Director or VP level, those people are going to look at their peers and demand a higher title.

The company will then have a similar problem at the VP or C level. It will result in a disjointed and confusing org chart that will need to be blown up. And if the company wants to hire above the person they over-titled, they may have to let that person go or give them a demotion (which will likely cause them to leave). The hard work will have to happen at some point. Over-titling people in the early days just kicks the can down the road. In his book, the High Growth Handbook, Elad Gil points out that, in the early days, Facebook and Google gave employees the lowest titles possible (VPs that came over from Yahoo! or eBay came in at the Manager or Director level).

With all of that said, the much more significant implication of Dan's Tweet is less about a decision around what title to give someone, and more broadly around the topic of discipline in building a startup. Startups are so hard to build and there will be all kinds of temptations to cut corners, delay hard decisions, and take the easy way out. Some examples:

  • Give away free pilots.

  • Build one-off features to close a deal.

  • Agree to overly flexible payment terms.

  • Hire an experienced person even if they're not the right fit with the team.

  • Delay terminating an employee that is damaging culture.

  • Partner with a well-known brand even though it doesn't align with the company strategy.

  • Raise more capital than is needed.

  • Pivot product roadmap based on a few customer requests.

I could add 100 more things to this list. The startups that consistently resist these temptations are the companies that win. Eventually, a lack of discipline will catch up to the startup and will make success even harder than it should be.

When joining a startup, look for signals of good discipline. You might not get the title you want, but that’s a small price to pay to get a seat on a rocket ship.

Irreplaceable vs. Replaceable

Here's the story of a company and a founder that has been told many times.

A company has become huge. They've had overwhelming success. But they've become slow and bureaucratic, and innovation has slowed. It's become a boring place to work.

A star employee, let's call her Jane, sees a clear opportunity to improve the company's situation. She has some great ideas on how to breathe fresh growth into the company. Jane's ideas are ignored. Nobody listens to her.

But Jane can't get her ideas out of her head. She needs to pursue her idea. So she leaves the company, raises some money, and builds a product and a company around her idea.

In order to succeed, Jane needs to build a great team. Because there are so many challenges in launching a new company that will beat the incumbents, she needs a team of superstars. She needs to hire people that are amazing. People that are able to run through walls. People that are irreplaceable.

So Jane builds a team full of stars.

And it works. The team of stars is able to take market share and grow rapidly. They have lots of success. They scale and have hundreds of employees. Soon they have thousands of employees.

Now, Jane's burden isn't to disrupt a business or industry; her burden is to protect what she's built. At this point, Jane needs to hire people that are replaceable. If someone is irreplaceable, that's a problem. She needs to build systems and processes and support around her employees so that no single employee is critical to the company's success.

Jane's company has gone from requiring people that are irreplaceable to requiring people that are replaceable. And the cycle continues…

As startups grow, they shift from breaking new ground to protecting their ground. This shift happens gradually and impacts some functions and roles before others. It's very difficult for companies to make this shift. It requires adaptable people, different people, and lots of process building. And you obviously will always need lynchpin employees in some roles.

The irreplaceable vs. replaceable concept is a simple framework for how to think about company building in the later stages of growth.

LTV, CAC, & B2C

Whenever I consider investing in a B2C startup, I immediately ask about the company's LTV/CAC ratio. From the Corporate Finance Institute:

LTV stands for "lifetime value" per customer and CAC stands for "customer acquisition cost." The LTV/CAC ratio compares the value of a customer over their lifetime, compared to the cost of acquiring them. This metric compares the value of a new customer over its lifetime relative to the cost of acquiring that customer. If the LTV/CAC ratio is less than 1.0 the company is destroying value, and if the ratio is greater than 1.0, it may be creating value, but more analysis is required. Generally speaking, a ratio greater than 3.0 is considered "good."

I’m less interested in the actual numbers than I’m interested in how the company is thinking about improving the numbers over time.

You could argue that a startup shouldn't be overly concerned with this metric in the early stages because they're still building the initial product or trying to find product/market fit and get the company off the ground. I disagree. B2B startups can get away with deprioritizing this metric in the early days because a good sales team can reliably acquire large amounts of users and revenue in large batches. And because of the way decisions are made within an enterprise, churn is typically significantly lower.

For B2C companies, LTV/CAC should be a part of the story from the beginning. Acquiring individual users is difficult and expensive. And since Facebook and Google, there haven't been that many widespread and effective ways of acquiring new users. Most of the high-quality channels are saturated. 

Ideally, B2C startups can bake user acquisition into their fundamental product offering; e.g. a supplier in a marketplace might bring their customers to the platform at no cost to the platform. AirBnB is a good example where landlords will often ask renters to book rentals through AirBnB.

Obviously, this won't be possible for every company. But the point remains: user acquisition and churn mitigation are critical considerations for any B2C startup right from the start.

Employee Stock Options & Funding Rounds

A friend of mine sent a link to a press release about a company that just closed a huge funding round at a huge valuation that expects to go public over the next few years. He wanted my thoughts on other companies that he could join that have had similarly successful funding rounds. His thinking was that he could make a lot of money on the next few financing events, even an IPO.

I think job searchers need to be careful with this kind of thinking. A successful funding round with great investors is a very positive signal. And it's always tempting to jump on the latest rocket ship. But there are a few things potential employees should consider before joining a company following a large funding announcement:

You're not going to get credit for the company's past success. If a company raises a Series B round at a $100M valuation, following a $10M Series A round, the company's valuation has grown by 10x. That's a lot of value creation. But if you join the company after the Series B has closed, you've missed out on all of it. The stock options you receive will be priced at the post Series B valuation. So you're starting from zero. You'll only get credit for the value you create going forward. You have to place a bet on the company's ability to continue to build value on top of what they've already created. A small caveat here: there's often a difference between the valuation investors paid and the company's fair market value, as determined by auditors. So employees that come in after the round might not pay as much as investors paid.

Valuations are super high right now. Because private company valuations are typically marked against the public market, and the public markets are on a 12-year bull run, valuations are arguably inflated at the moment. If the bull market continues, this isn't a problem. But if prices come back down to earth, valuations could come down, and you may find that your options are underwater (meaning they're worth less than the price you'll have to pay for them). 

The later you join, the less equity you'll get. Startups reward early employees with lots of equity (potential upside) in return for taking the risk of joining before anything has been built. As time goes on, this risk decreases, and so does the amount of equity the company needs to grant to attract great people. Less risk typically means less equity.

The less senior you are, the less equity you'll get. Generally, the really material stock option grants (.5% to 2% of the value of the company) are reserved for the most senior executives. Employees at lower levels will receive a fraction of that.

Your options have to vest. In most cases, you won't just get an equity grant. You'll have a vesting schedule. Typically over four years with a 1-year cliff. Meaning you won't have the right to buy your options unless you've been at the company for more than a year. 

Your vested options aren't liquid. Not only do you have to create value on top of the last funding round, but you also have to find a way to cash out at some point. Generally, this is only done through an acquisition, a secondary offering where an investor buys some amount of employee shares, or an IPO. While IPOs have made a resurgence, it's enormously rare that a startup makes it that far; of the tens of thousands of startups out there, less than 200 companies went public in 2019. 

With all of this said, don't get me wrong, funding rounds are an exciting thing. And they're absolutely a signal that the company is onto something. And I’m a huge fan of investing in private companies as early as possible. My point is that potential employees should act like an investor and dig deep on how much value they believe can be created following the big announcement, and what share of that value they'll receive, and the likelihood that that value will be liquid within a reasonable time frame. 

This is particularly important for salespeople as they negotiate job offers. There's a tradeoff associated with optimizing for your own success (cash from commission) versus the success of the larger organization (equity). Depending on the circumstances, one can be a lot bigger than the other. The above considerations are important inputs into how to think about the company you might want to join and the compensation plan you want to advocate for as you negotiate an offer.